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Abstract 
 
A key challenge for researchers has been to affect 
change in user security behavior in organizations. 
Several theories from different domains have been used 
for understanding and changing user security behavior 
including deterrence, fear appeals, and education; 
however, the success of these approaches has been low. 
In this research we examine the role of financial 
incentives in changing user behavior; we specifically 
provide incentives to users for good security practices. 
The study attempts to switch user behavior such that 
they adopt good security habits however it recognizes 
the limitations of extrinsic rewards in being temporary 
and couples the extrinsic rewards to affect intrinsic 
motivation through use of nudges. The field study 
shows positive results however the number of subjects 
in our study was small (24). Our goal is to extend the 
study by large scale data collection to further validate 
our results.  
 
1. Introduction  
The threat and impact of cybersecurity breaches are 
observed throughout society, from 2.5 million security 
clearance files compromised at a government agency to 
huge consumer data losses at EBay, Anthem, Sony, 
Target, JP Morgan, and other companies.  Employees 
are widely recognized as the weakest link in an 
organization’s cybersecurity practice. Yet current 
programs designed to improve employee security 
behaviors often fail because interventions are not 
viewed as personally relevant (Johnston et al., 2019a, 
2019b). Our study addresses a significant gap in 
scientific investigations of user cybersecurity hygiene 
by providing direct financial incentives to motivate 
users to comply with organizational cybersecurity 
policies and procedures. In addition, we tested the 
effect of psychological manipulations (nudges) in 
sustaining compliance. 
Research points to the organizational insider, 
typically the employee or contractor, as a key threat to 
the security of information, and inspires the perennial 
organizational mandate of decreasing that risk (Im and 
Baskerville 2005; Stanton et al. 2005; Guo et al. 2011, 
Warkentin and Willison 2009; Willison and Warkentin 
2013). Insider threats can manifest from carelessness, 
apathy, or malicious behavior.  The recent dramatic 
rise in personal mobile devices in the workplace and 
third-party applications has introduced even more 
potential vectors for data leakage from employee 
carelessness and noncompliance.  Private and public-
sector enterprises are coming to grips with the 
increased risks of the bring your own device (BYOD) 
phenomenon, with employees exhibiting a lack of 
caution as devices, formats, and connectivity 
proliferate, and data crosses previously demarcated 
personal, public, and professional lines. In its survey of 
more than 500 employees at mid-to-large companies, 
Centrify found that forty-three percent have accessed 
sensitive corporate data while on an unsecured public 
network (Kaneshige, 2014).  
 
No significant improvement in these trends has 
been realized, despite a range of approaches designed 
and implemented to improve employee security 
compliance. Methods range from implementing 
information security policies, to security education 
training and awareness (SETA) campaigns, to online 
monitoring and fear-based approaches, to punitive 
measures. Mutchler and Warkentin (2015) note that 
awareness programs are frequently deemed as an 
ineffective and unproductive use of corporate funds. A 
2014 Information Security Forum survey noted that 
75% of its member organizations have an ongoing 
security awareness program, but only 15% report 
having reached the level of awareness and 
improvement that they were striving for.  The 
limitations of standard security awareness warnings 
and programs have been well documented (see 
Dhamija et al., 2006; Sunshine et al.. 2009; Whitten 
and Tyger, 1998, etc.). We argue that the limited 
effectiveness of security interventions is partially due 
to a failure to properly incentivize user behavior.  
 
The dominant theoretical frameworks used by 
researchers to improve information security have been 
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Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1975; 1983) 
and Deterrence Theory (Straub, 1990; Straub and 
Welke, 1998). These theories suggest that users make 
rational security decisions by cognitively weighing the 
relative gains and losses associated with their choices 
within a decision calculus. They assume that users will 
respond rationally to perceived security threats in the 
environment and to sanctions imposed on 
noncompliance. Users are expected to internally 
regulate their behavior based on an understanding of 
security threats and the consequences of risky 
behavior.  However, in the course of daily work 
activities, users may minimize the risks associated with 
their behavior, may rationalize noncompliant behavior, 
and may feel that the costs of compliance outweigh 
perceived benefits. Neither intrinsic nor extrinsic 
incentives discussed in the literature to motivate 
compliance with security policies have been very 
effective. A recent meta-analysis (Cram et al., 2019) 
found that rewards only have a small effect on policy 
compliance. The authors included both tangible (e.g. 
prizes) and intangible (e.g. acknowledgement of the 
supervisor) rewards in this category. It is still unclear 
how monetary rewards will impact users’ compliance 
with policies. We expect monetary rewards to have a 
stronger effect than other types of rewards, because it 
“prices” the compliance behaviors and gives users a 
clear value. We propose altering user behavior and 
increasing compliance by changing the security 
decision calculus.  Drawing on principles of behavioral 
economics, we used extrinsic rewards (i.e. financial 
incentives) to initiate compliance, and psychological 
manipulations (nudges) to promote ongoing internal 
regulation of security behavior, such that users sustain 
secure behaviors when incentives are no longer in 
place. 
 
2. Literature  
Where Protection Motivation Theory and 
Deterrence Theory emphasize rational decision making 
as the basis for behavior change, the field of behavioral 
economics focuses on the cognitive, social, and 
emotional factors that influence the choices that people 
make in particular contexts.  
The lack of efficacy in security programs lies 
squarely in the gap between user motivation and 
compliance, or intention and execution.  Acquisti and 
Grosslags (2004) showed that while most users profess 
a strong desire to have and maintain secure systems, 
they also show a surprising willingness to divulge 
personal information for as little as $0.25.  Christin 
(2011) provided minimal financial incentives to users 
willing to download unknown executables. Results 
demonstrated that, in direct opposition to their stated 
preferences, most users do not attach an economic 
value to the security of their systems: 70% of all 
participants in the study understood that running 
unknown programs could be dangerous, yet all chose 
to do so once paid. In addition, users often feel that the 
effort needed to comply with security policy outweighs 
the rewards associated with compliance. Beautement et 
al. (2009) coined the term the ‘compliance budget’ to 
refer to the reasonable amount of effort that employees 
are willing to expend to keep the organization safe. 
Muraven et al. (2008) note that the tasks related to 
compliance require users to tap a limited amount of 
“vitality” that is needed for self-control, thereby 
depleting the reserves for future activities. In general, 
functionality often overshadows security in terms of 
prioritizing the tasks at hand. 
 
Financial incentives have long been assumed to 
affect behavior and performance.  Behaviorists and 
economists argue that financial incentives exert a 
strong influence on worker effort, persistence, and 
performance. These assumptions have been supported 
by research. In a review of organizational research, 
Ilgen (1990) found positive relationship between 
financial incentives offered to workers and 
performance. Pay-for-performance systems have 
generally been successful in improving the quantity of 
performance, if not the quality (Baker et al., 1988; 
Jenkins et al., 1998). Camerer and Hogarth (1999) 
found that the positive effects of financial incentives 
are strongest for tasks in which effort and performance 
are closely linked.  
Despite generally positive results, the use of 
extrinsic incentives has been criticized by researchers 
for several reasons. Behavior that occurs in the 
presence of a reward is unlikely to be sustained when it 
is withdrawn. This suggests that once financial 
incentives are instituted, they must be maintained to 
ensure desired results. Prolonged use of financial 
incentives can be costly to organizations, so changes in 
behavior need to be strong enough to ensure a positive 
return on investment. Psychologists and behavioral 
economists have also identified unintended 
consequences of financial rewards; rewards may 
increase target behaviors while reducing other 
desirable behaviors (e.g., quality) or may inadvertently 
increase undesirable behaviors (e.g., cheating) (Kerr, 
1975). Other psychologists argue that financial 
incentives undermine intrinsic motivation, which is 
seen as essential for prolonged effort and interest in an 
activity. Intrinsic motivation refers to actions that are 
inherently interesting or enjoyable, whereas extrinsic 
motivation refers to actions that lead to outcomes that 
are separate from the activity itself (e.g., money, 
praise; Ryan & Deci, 2000).  Intrinsic motivation is a 
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powerful source of motivation that sustains 
engagement and effort over extended periods of time 
without the need for “external prods, pressures, or 
rewards” (Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 56).  However, it is 
most relevant for explaining behaviors that are 
exploratory, curiosity-driven, or associated with play. 
Workers can hardly be seen as intrinsically motivated 
to follow security policies; security-related tasks are 
not designed to be intrinsically interesting and thus 
require some type of extrinsic motivation. The 
challenge is to prevent or mitigate the negative and 
unintended consequences of extrinsic motivation noted 
above.   
 
The goal of this research is to provide an incentive 
that is powerful enough to motivate users to comply 
with security policies, and then identify psychological 
nudges that can sustain compliance. We used financial 
incentives to “flip the switch,” to increase user 
motivation to act safely. We first used financial 
incentives because the existing literature suggests that 
intrinsic and social incentives are not operating 
strongly in the typical security context. Analogous to 
investing in wellness programs to manage corporate 
healthcare costs; incentive programs could prove an 
economical way to reduce breaches and overall 
security costs. Beyond encouraging secure behaviors, 
incentives directly and positively acknowledge the 
importance of the user’s personal decisions to the 
security of the overall network. However, relying on 
financial incentives may not be a viable long-term 
solution to an organization’s security problems. It is 
also important to find ways to promote ongoing 
internal regulation of security behavior and we do this 
through use of nudges to sustain the behavior.  
 
3. Research Design  
The participants were employees from a local 
company that develops software for the management of 
enterprise information. There were 27 employees who 
volunteered to participate in the study. Among these 
participants, one was aware about our study purpose 
and hypotheses, one left the company in the middle of 
the study, and one never responded to our emails. Thus, 
the data from these three employees were removed 
from data analysis, resulting in 24 valid cases (17 
males and 7 females, mean age = 33.22, S.D. = 9.51) 
used for analyses. There was a variety in participants’ 
positions, including software engineer, QA analyst, 
bookkeeper, client manager, etc. 
 
We obtained informed consent from participants 
before data collection was started. The procedure of the 
study was introduced to the participants, and they were 
informed that all evaluations on their information 
security behaviors would be in accordance with their 
company’s policies, and they had the right to quit the 
study any time without penalties. In addition, in order 
to track participants’ responses to phishing emails, we 
sent faking phishing emails to the participants. But the 
participants were not informed that they would receive 
phishing emails from us. Two phishing emails were 
sent to the participants’ work email address per week at 
random days and time. The phishing emails vary in the 
level of work-contextualization and individualization. 
Two trained graduate students rated the emails on the 
level of contextualization. More work-contextualized 
emails contain more cues that indicate a specific 
workplace setting or are more related to the receiver’s 
work role. The interrater agreement is good between 
the two raters (ICC [A,2] = .839). We thus used the 
averaged rating as an indicator of the level of 
contextualization. An example of a none or slightly 
contextualized phishing email is an email sent by a 
bank notifying an abnormal account activity. An 
example of a highly contextualized phishing email is 
an email notifying receiver of an active threat to 
company server. One contextualized and one non-
contextualized phishing email were sent to participants 
each week. In addition, one of the four emails that 
participants receive every two weeks was 
individualized. Individualization was manipulated by 
including  the email receiver’s name in the content. All 
data were encrypted and delivered to the research team 
directly and no person in the company had access to 
the data of participants. 
 
The first two week’s behavioral data were used as a 
baseline. In the third week, a 30-minute training 
session was provided to the participants by the 
company’s IT person to help them review the 
company’s policies, which includes protection of 
hardcopy documents, safe internet usage, safe email 
behaviors, software installation and updates, account 
safety, and use of removable storage. The participants 
were provided with a hardcopy of the notes and a list 
of behaviors that would be tracked and evaluated in the 
study. The reward program started from the fifth week. 
The participants could gain at maximum 50 dollars per 
week if they fully complied with the company’s 
policies, 40 dollars if one violation was detected, 30 
dollars if two violations, 20 dollars if three violations, 
and zero dollars if more than three violations. 
Feedback on participants’ behaviors from the previous 
week and the accumulated amount of monetary reward 
was provided starting from week 6. The reward 
program lasted for 12 weeks and ended at the end of 
the 17th week of the study. Each participant received a 
check issued by the researchers’ institution. 
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Both rewards and feedback were removed starting 
from week 18. We kept collecting data on participants’ 
information security behaviors to examine if their 
behaviors retained after the removal of rewards. In 
weeks 20 and 21, we sent nudges through emails to the 
participants on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday 
mornings to remind them to follow the company’s 
information security policies. The nudges read as “*** 
employees are continuing to practice careful and safe 
cybersecurity behaviors. Keep up the good work!” 
Then in week 22, we removed nudges again. 
 
 
Figure 1: Experimental Timeline 
 
Data were collected on several metrics: 1) strength 
of passwords, measured with a brute-forced password 
cracking tool; 2) time and number of clicks on phishing 
emails, and whether the links embedded in the emails 
were clicked; and 3) number of times non-work emails 
were used on work computer, which was measured 
with users’ webpage visiting log.  
 
4. Results 
All participants’ passwords were tested through a 
brute-forced cracking tool and were considered weak if 
cracked. Each week we calculated the number of 
employees that had a password that was easily cracked. 
Figure 2 shows the trend in employees’ behaviors. In 
the first two weeks of the study, there were four 
participants who used weak passwords. After the 
training that was provided in week 3, there was a drop-
off in the number of participants who set weak 
passwords. That number lowered to 1 at week 5, when 
the reward program started. Because the company’s 
computer system forces the employees to reset 
passwords every three months, there were a couple 
new weak passwords detected during the period of 
reward program (week 6-17). However, starting from 
week 14, the number of participants who had weak 
passwords dropped down to zero and remained at zero 
thereafter. Our results showed that monetary incentive 
did have an effect on improving people’s password 
security behaviors, although there is some time lag 
between the initiate of incentive and when full 
compliance was reached. 
 
Figure 2. Number of participants who set weak 
passwords. 
The number of times the phishing emails were 
opened remained at a relatively low level during the 
whole period of study. To start from, the baseline of 
clicks was low, with no participants opening the 
phishing emails we sent in the first five weeks (No 
phishing emails were sent during the training week – 
week 3). The first peak appeared in week 8. There 
were two participants who opened the phishing email 
titled “Sorry about sending this late” (average 
contextualization rating = 4.5 on a 1-5 scale, 
individualized). The second peak was in week 16, with 
one participant opening the phishing email titled “Job 
opportunity” (average contextualization rating = 3.5 on 
a 1-5 scale, non-individualized). After the rewards 
were removed, there seemed to be an increase in the 
number of participants who opened the phishing 
emails. In week 20, when rewards were removed while 
nudges were in place, there was one participant who 
opened the email titled “Reminder: Online meeting 
starts in 1 day” (average contextualization rating =4 on 
a 1-5 scale, non-individualized), and another 4 
participants who opened the emails titled “Verify your 
email address” sent from a fake Apple customer 
service account (average contextualization rating = 1 
on 1-5 scale, individualized). However, none of the 
participants who opened the phishing emails went one 
step further to click the links embedded in the emails. 
Partly due to the nature of the company business which 
both contractually and legally obliges its employees to 
protect the data they possess, it seems employees in 
this local company already had high levels of 
awareness of and good practice regarding phishing 
emails. However, we did notice an increase in the 
number of people who opened phishing emails after 
the incentives were removed (week 20). In addition, 
most of the phishing emails that were opened by 
participants were designed to be work-relevant. 
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Figure 3. Number of participants who opened phishing 
emails. 
 
Figure 4 shows the number of people who used 
non-work emails. In the first 5 weeks, before incentive 
program came into effect, the number of participants 
who opened non-work emails were relatively high. 
There was a significant drop in week 6, when the 
reward program started. However, the number went 
back to a level comparable to that before reward 
program started since week 7. The significant drop 
appeared in week 10 and the number of people who 
used non-work emails remained relatively low 
thereafter. This trajectory of behavioral change is 
similar to that of password practice. Incentives did 
show an effect on influencing people’s behavior but 
took some time to reach its maximum effect.  
 
 
Figure 4. Number of participants who used non-work 
emails on work computers. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
The research goal was to investigate whether 
incentives can be used to promote behavior change 
leading to improved compliance with security 
guidelines and processes. Our sample was a small 
forensics firm with about 70 employees; however, our 
valid sample size was small with 24 individuals. The 
results indicate a clear shift in safe password practice 
and the use of non-work email due to incentives 
compared to the baseline security behavior. Follow-up 
study post incentives, during which nudges were given, 
showed some signs of increase in employees’ non-
compliance but the compliance level was generally 
higher than that before the incentive program started. 
However, the results need to be interpreted with 
caution because the follow-up stage was relatively 
short and that we only tested nudges for two weeks, 
which prevents us from making a strong conclusion. A 
larger study is now planned to understand the role of 
incentives further as well as to clarify the role of 
nudges in sustaining the behavior.  
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